2 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/doc/source/faq.rst b/doc/source/faq.rst
index 09cb244..0f70c17 100644
--- a/doc/source/faq.rst
+++ b/doc/source/faq.rst
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ Contact `NBS System <https://nbs-system.com>`_.
 Unimplemented mitigations and abandoned ideas
 ---------------------------------------------
 
-Contant time comparisons
-""""""""""""""""""""""""
+Constant time comparisons
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""
 We didn't manage to perform time-based side-channel attacks on strings 
 against real world PHP application, and the results that we gathered on
 tailored test cases weren't concluding: for simplicity's sake, we chose
diff --git a/doc/source/features.rst b/doc/source/features.rst
index 076e4e4..bf535e1 100644
--- a/doc/source/features.rst
+++ b/doc/source/features.rst
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ killers and virtual-patching. The first category provides primitives to kill var
 bug families (like arbitrary code execution via ``unserialize`` for example) or rise the 
 cost of exploitation, the second one is a highly configurable system to patch functions in php itself.
 
-Bug classes killed
-------------------
+Bug classes killed or mitigated
+-------------------------------
 
 ``system`` injections
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Unfortunately, passing user-controlled parameters to it often leads to an arbitr
 
   --- `The PHP documentation about system <https://secure.php.net/manual/en/function.system.php>`_
 
-We're kind of killing it by filtering the ``$``, ``|``, ``;``, ````` and ``&`` chars in our 
+We're mitigating it by filtering the ``$``, ``|``, ``;``, `````, ``\n`` and ``&`` chars in our
 default configuration, making it a lot harder for an attacker to inject arbitrary commands.
 
 This family of vulnerabilities lead to various CVE, like: