1 files changed, 351 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/other/openssh-2.1.1p4/auth-krb4.c b/other/openssh-2.1.1p4/auth-krb4.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e32089b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/other/openssh-2.1.1p4/auth-krb4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/*
+ *    Dug Song <dugsong@UMICH.EDU>
+ *    Kerberos v4 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.15 2000/06/22 23:54:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+char *ticket = NULL;
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * try krb4 authentication,
+ * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
+ */
+
+int
+auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
+{
+        AUTH_DAT adata;
+        KTEXT_ST tkt;
+        struct hostent *hp;
+        unsigned long faddr;
+        char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+        char phost[INST_SZ];
+        char realm[REALM_SZ];
+        int r;
+
+        /*
+         * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
+         * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
+         */
+        if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
+
+                /* Set up our ticket file. */
+                if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid)) {
+                        log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
+                            pw->pw_name);
+                        goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+                }
+                /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
+                r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "",
+                    realm, "krbtgt", realm,
+                    DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *) password);
+                if (r != INTK_OK) {
+                        packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 password "
+                            "authentication for %s failed: %s",
+                            pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                        goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+                }
+                /* Successful authentication. */
+                chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+                /*
+                 * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
+                 * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
+                 * to a bogus Kerberos server.
+                 */
+                (void) gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+                (void) strlcpy(phost, (char *) krb_get_phost(localhost),
+                    INST_SZ);
+                r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
+
+                if (r == KSUCCESS) {
+                        if (!(hp = gethostbyname(localhost))) {
+                                log("Couldn't get local host address!");
+                                goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+                        }
+                        memmove((void *) &faddr, (void *) hp->h_addr,
+                            sizeof(faddr));
+
+                        /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
+                        r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
+                            faddr, &adata, "");
+                        if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
+                                /*
+                                 * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
+                                 * localhost. Allow login.
+                                 */
+                                log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+                                    "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
+                                    pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                        } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+                                log("Kerberos V4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+                                    KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                                goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+                        }
+                } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
+                        /*
+                         * Allow login if no rcmd service exists, but
+                         * log the error.
+                         */
+                        log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+                            "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
+                        krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+                } else {
+                        /*
+                         * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
+                         */
+                        packet_send_debug("WARNING: Kerberos V4 TGT "
+                            "possibly spoofed for %s: %s",
+                            pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                        goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+                }
+
+                /* Authentication succeeded. */
+                return 1;
+
+kerberos_auth_failure:
+                krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+
+                if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+                        return 0;
+        } else {
+                /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
+                packet_send_debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+        }
+        /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+        return -1;
+}
+
+void
+krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+{
+        debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
+        if (ticket) {
+                (void) dest_tkt();
+                xfree(ticket);
+                ticket = NULL;
+        }
+}
+
+int
+krb4_init(uid_t uid)
+{
+        static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+        const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
+        struct stat st;
+        int fd;
+
+        if (!ticket) {
+                /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
+                ticket = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+#ifdef AFS
+                if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
+                        tkt_root = "/ticket/";
+#endif /* AFS */
+                snprintf(ticket, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%d_%d", tkt_root, uid, getpid());
+                (void) krb_set_tkt_string(ticket);
+        }
+        /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
+        if (!cleanup_registered) {
+                fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+                cleanup_registered = 1;
+        }
+        /* Try to create our ticket file. */
+        if ((fd = mkstemp(ticket)) != -1) {
+                close(fd);
+                return 1;
+        }
+        /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
+        if (lstat(ticket, &st) != -1) {
+                if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
+                    st.st_uid == uid)
+                        return 1;
+        }
+        /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving bad ticket for inspection. */
+        log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", ticket);
+        fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+        cleanup_registered = 0;
+        xfree(ticket);
+        ticket = NULL;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
+{
+        AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
+        KTEXT_ST reply;
+        char instance[INST_SZ];
+        int r, s;
+        socklen_t slen;
+        u_int cksum;
+        Key_schedule schedule;
+        struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
+
+        s = packet_get_connection_in();
+
+        slen = sizeof(local);
+        memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
+        if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
+                debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+        slen = sizeof(foreign);
+        memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
+        if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+                debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+                fatal_cleanup();
+        }
+        instance[0] = '*';
+        instance[1] = 0;
+
+        /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
+        if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, 0, &adat, ""))) {
+                packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
+
+        *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
+        (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
+            *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
+
+        /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
+        if (kuserok(&adat, (char *) server_user) != KSUCCESS) {
+                packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed!");
+                log("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to account %s",
+                    *client, server_user);
+                xfree(*client);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
+           session key. */
+        cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
+        cksum = htonl(cksum);
+
+        /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
+           empty message, admitting our failure. */
+        if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
+            schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
+                packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                reply.dat[0] = 0;
+                reply.length = 0;
+        } else
+                reply.length = r;
+
+        /* Clear session key. */
+        memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
+
+        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
+        packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
+        packet_send();
+        packet_write_wait();
+        return 1;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+int
+auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *pw, const char *string)
+{
+        CREDENTIALS creds;
+
+        if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
+                log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
+                packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
+                goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+                strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
+
+        if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
+                log("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
+                    creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm,
+                    pw->pw_name);
+                packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+                    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
+                    creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+                goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+        }
+        if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid))
+                goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+
+        if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
+                goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+
+        if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
+            creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno,
+            &creds.ticket_st, creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
+                packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt refused: couldn't save credentials");
+                goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+        }
+        /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
+        chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+        packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt accepted (%s.%s@%s, %s%s%s@%s)",
+            creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm, creds.pname,
+            creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
+        memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+        packet_send();
+        packet_write_wait();
+        return 1;
+
+auth_kerberos_tgt_failure:
+        krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+        memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+        packet_send();
+        packet_write_wait();
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+auth_afs_token(struct passwd *pw, const char *token_string)
+{
+        CREDENTIALS creds;
+        uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
+
+        if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
+                log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
+                packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
+                packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+                packet_send();
+                packet_write_wait();
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+                strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
+
+        if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
+                uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
+
+        if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
+                log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname, creds.realm,
+                    pw->pw_name);
+                packet_send_debug("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
+                    creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+                memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+                packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+                packet_send();
+                packet_write_wait();
+                return 0;
+        }
+        packet_send_debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s, %s@%s)", creds.service,
+            creds.realm, creds.pname, creds.realm);
+        memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+        packet_send();
+        packet_write_wait();
+        return 1;
+}
+#endif /* AFS */